Created on April 23, 1998
First of all, my apologies for not meeting the usual timetable Wednesday for the installment of Outside the Line of Sight. This week I was delayed trying to finalize the replacement of my own damaged vehicle, which as of late Wednesday evening, I finally accomplished after a three week search with limited time available. When the crisis first occurred I did inquire whether a city existed in which the vehicle could sit idle and repair at the rate of 1 hit point per day, but was told emphatically that in the event such a city did exist a future generation would be at the wheel -- certainly not me. And so buy points became the only option, hopeful they would buy me a bit more than one elephant tank with a looming red cross.
Certainly one of the always-to-be-returned-to themes within Even Further will be the examination of why we wage on!, what spirit or element is at work that enables us to thrive in this creative environment, and how with such a diverse composition of combatants we continue to experience a wealth of comradery. I subscribe to a list that has been discussing for some time at some length the process of human conception and its role or hope in the future of global processes. One of the recent submissions by the session's coordinator Alex Dorscht caused me to pause and reflect upon the mythic quality of TPG2 and our heroic/tragic (your preference) roles as personas within its development and evolution. Here were his comments:
The approach and the process of conceptualizing or visualizing the nature and conditions of human existence beyond human experience begins with "reading" mental images the unaided human mind generates from human experience, perceptions, and feelings. The approach progresses to extrapolating and abstracting from mental images and from an intuitive awareness, an awareness of experience, perceptions, and feelings only to the degree to which they impress themselves of the conscious mind. The process advances from the random construction of vague and unclear intentional mental images to the systematic construction of reasoned, ordered, and detailed images. It moves on to constructing elaborate and complex conceptual constructs from selected experience.
Too early in the morning and much too early in the page's progression to digress to pretense or think myself learned in metaphysics or the social propensities of integrating mind into myth. After all, "I hear I fight on intuition." Perhaps I live that way as well.
The fact remains, so what? Knowing the details doesn't change our behavior. We adapt. More often we change our myth to match our limitations or Earl's. The greatest virtue remains the monopoly of the human participant, not the AI - simple inherent pliancy. We learn, we bend, we modify, we are always in the process of becoming. Earl? He sits placidly while tormentedly still waiting for the necromancers to make yet another bone dance.
The element we share and so often in controversy is a factor not under our domain to control: circumstance, luck, chance, or sudden genius. As I have read through Clausewitz, I find and interpret his stance to be succinct and appropriate - as luck goes, it effects the attacker equally as it does the defender. It need not be considered a factor. What befalls one, befalls the other.
The struggle is one reminiscent of the one within ourselves, dependent on style, on our individual assignments and journeys. What we find relatively stable requires subtle balances. What we discover to be unstable or chaotic requires force and order to be contained in a design of its natural shape, that is, one of our making and one of our enforceable wills.
How well we are acquainted with our missions and intention appropriately reflect the "necessity of purpose in achieving objective," just as it is fitting that long descriptions should equal the struggle of the conflict they represent. By what other means do we have to correctly assess our intention? The means and ends of war are often decided by those best in command of their objectives. It serves as lesson and demonstration their ability to convey those conceptions to the very soldiers that elect to see them through to fruition.
There is something ironic, yet most appropriate that "Even Further" Outside the Line of Sight should entertain any notion of directing principle to the line of sight (LOS) proper. Detailing LOS is not unlike reaching agreement on what is red or blue. Our sights vary. The basis from which we "see" all change with elements in play, all reflect in our individual unit's frame of reference and elevation. But, just as colors can be given certain specific frames of measure wherein perceptions can be compared, so it is with the concept of LOS. Finding the medium or vehicle to break down its elements is the most difficult task. In lieu of great ambition, a wealth of knowledge, or of immense practical experience, I defer to the equipment offered me by circumstance and/or the myth itself. And in doing so find reasonable, if not exceptional methods with which to begin the analysis: the programmer, the manual, and our own Anonymous General.
The comments of the programmer have already been explored in both his note regarding AI elements and in this week's installment of Outside the Line of Sight. The manual, I presume, is within each of our grasps. Nevertheless, a brief review of its "citings" is in order:
Sighting Style: The FULL VIEW setting will show every piece currently in play for both sides. The LIMITED TO LOS (Line of Sight) option will limit the sighting of the enemy to the line of sight. An enemy unit will appear when it is spotted by any friendly unit. A unit can be sighted when it is within 25 hexes and does not have certain terrain types or artillery barrages in a straight line to a friendly unit. Besides the artillery barrage the following terrains block LOS: Forest, mountains, fortifications and cities. The weather can also have an effect on the distance that a unit may be spotted. Rain and fog limit the sighting range to 10, night to 5 hexes.
It seems a basic concept and on the surface one easily understood, but I confess myself that until very recently I was unaware that individual units did not in themselves possess varying ranges of sight. Yes, in my intuitive and flawed framework the Elephant Tank was indeed the best "spotter" in light of his range being the greatest. As it turns out, of course, a single infantry upon the same hill would see the same scenes. Having pursued that thinking during scenario play resulted in no measurable significance, but the ET was able to change the course of the future a more easily than the infantry as, already in place, his aim was sure and true.
As for Anonymous, I relay to you here an email I received from him. I have not asked his permission to include it here, but akin to my proclivity for incessant verbosity on issues of which I know a smattering, his would not be restrained regarding issues of which he is certainly most practiced and learned. With that, his comments:
In TPG2 "LOS" is said in many ways, properly and improperly.
A. Properly, LOS refers to the unobstructed imaginary line that connects two hexes. In this sense, it is used to refer to the capacity to "see" one hex from another.
B. Related to A, but improper, is the use in TPG2 for "Field of Sight", the aggregate hexes visible from one hex (B1) for firing purposes or from many (B2) mainly for determining licit hexes for artillery plots.
While A and B refer to a capacity to know of the presence of units in certain hexes, they do not correspond exactly to the TPG2 knowledge of those same units.
C. Another, extremely improper, sense in which LOS is used is to refer to the units that are actually sighted -- this is the sense in which LOS is used in "Limit display of enemy locations to LOS". Strictly, this sense of LOS means those in LOS according to sense B, whose position is known.
But Limit to LOS is more complicated than that. TPG2's screen indicates the location of enemy units as 1) marked clearly 2) shaded or 3) invisible.
1) marked clearly are those in B2 that are in open terrain, those that have moved into covered terrain B2 hexes, those in B2 hexes that have fired in a preceding turn, and so on.
2) a) marked as shaded are those units out of B2 that have fired (read: artillery), b) those units that were in B2, but, due to a change in the weather or the removal of the sighting unit(s), no longer are, and haven't changed position since they were sighted, and finally c) those in covered hexes that haven't met the criteria for being marked clearly (what I will call hidden) on the turn that they have fired.
3) invisible are all other units. note that fixed units (arty, planes?) and units in forts may change indication (esp. from 2 to 3) according to rules I haven't figured out.
The problem is that 2a and 2b indicate units known-not-in-B2, while 2c indicates units that are known and in B2, but unable to be hit because, as the game says, there's "No LOS to target".
In short, you're right when you say: My confusion arises with the concept of units being both hidden (blocking LOS) and in LOS hexes.
In fact, this is the confusion: hidden here refers technically to a unit in a B2 hex that has not fulfilled the criteria to be "seen" in the sense of 1 (2c obviously does not apply to artillery plots). Theoretically Earl doesn't know of the existence of the unit, but he sure can target the hex. Such a case occurs with a Heavy Artillery in a woods hex within Earl's B2 field on turn 1. It hasn't fired, and doesn't show up on Earl's hypothetical screen, but Earl knows it's there, and Earl can target that hex with an MA round.
At least that's what I think.
And think well he does, doesn't he? I could have said it longer, but not better. Thanks Anon.
The possibility looms in the future that one day Perfect General II can be played over the lines of the internet. In the event that two people agree to set aside the same 2-12 hours or stagger their sessions over the course of 2-12 weeks, each time attempting to recapture whatever momentary morale was last captivating their strategies - voila! Welcome to the modern age.
If you're expecting me to offer up a "Let's get rrrrrready to rrrrrumble", think again. I'll leave that to the more energetic and techno-wowed crowd. I'm admittedly no head-to-head patriot. There are forms of combat where the struggle between two formidable opponents gives rise to a certain ambiance: chess, boxing (the "sweet science"), or billiards for example.
The electronic environment offers us one overlooked and underrated luxury. Logging off. I've grown to appreciate the segregated hours I spend with the me versus your-admirably-designed-scenarios. See, Earl hasn't improved, or grown, or mastered any new techniques. You designers do that. And yes, AI5 has its limitations, but if you think Earl's lacking - wait until you start playing humans.
Though I'm grateful for their creations, I'm no fan of programmers. I find them usually pretentious, self-indulgent, and seeking celebrity status. I am even less a fan of unsolicited liaisons attaching themselves to the hems of their garments. Retrospectively, I will add that our own Andy Visscher has been demonstrably an amicable exception. But, if for no other reason, I won't be chomping at the bit about news from the unix-emulation front because I'll be forced to hear it from people who don't even play the game.
Respectfully,
ColEndgame