Even Further

by endgame

Created on July 29, 1999


Too Much of This, Too Little of That

Life demands so much and offers no reasonable explanation why the off-shore artillery wins in the end.

Yet we wage on, closing the hatches, believing our armor will prevail.

Note: This should be the place where I explain my recent absence from authoring this page, as well as thanking Colonel Kev for his candid and heartfelt submissions in the duration. The appreciation I have for his guest role cannot be measured in type or phrase. His election to contribute momentum and the appearance of consistency to this section is to be praised. I can aspire to offer my comments on a more regular basis, but I would be detailing a reinforcement that, in fact, resembles more the random than the certain. Visions and observations committed to words is a continual state of flux, ranging from the grandiose notion that they address the core of our humanity to the harsh reality that four or five men may review them with minuscule effect on anyone or anything at all. The 'saved game' offers us a return to a moment in time where nothing has changed; no fit of fury, depth of despair, exuberance, or epiphany can alter its domain. Of men, of myself, I cannot say the same. I sought to thank and explain. I think I have done so.

"Sergeant, Load 'em Up!"

Played the first scenario of Hans' Offspring for the second time. Promoted from 1st Lieutenant to Captain, I thought I had achieved the campaign objective. Obviously there was an additional unit outside my line of sight that prevented it. At least that's my working theory. I found it to be an excellent exercise in the learning experience. As an instrument to examine an original plan, i.e. the plan opted going in, then taking that knowledge in a second attempt to measure effects of the original observations, two plays were sufficient to peak my interest in the alterations I employed during the second endeavor. Too many times we, of habit or design, use similar approaches in subsequent investigations only to find ourselves with familiar disappointment in the results. Perhaps it is best to always imagine having not yet tapped the spirit or resolve, the tactic or the plan, necessary to achieve optimal results under specific conflict conditions. In any serious inquiry the trials must be performed countless times before we are able to identify consistent elements of the design. We cannot always count on a victory although certainly it should be our aim, but not our all to end all parameters for measuring experience.

This could have been addressed through the privacy of email, tossed in the Recycle Bin as it almost was, talked about with colleagues as it was in one case, blown off in another, or I could take it to the page that originally was meant to convey those 'other' thoughts that occur outside the line of sight, i.e. beyond your normal view of the page. In this case, my hope is that thinking aloud and sharing some responses in a bit different fashion might stimulate some conversation about the design process and its rights, wrongs, freedoms, limitations, and to no small degree - creative license. In addition, I would hope to encourage factions within our community to develop comprehensive and ongoing analysis of specific submissions; in an ideal setting all submissions, but we have no such luxury of time to afford this kind of grand endeavor. Lastly, that it might inspire an innovation in the way we communicate our experiences with one another.

As a result, we must surely bring about full course a discourse or dialogue on the art of play. I've addressed on occasion the virtues of first play and still want to develop that thought 'even further.' In this edition I hint, not so discreetly, at the idea of repetitive plays and premature judgments about revelations during first encounters. How we quickly point to design as a causal agent for despair when it might well be our own predilections, preconceptions - misapplications notwithstanding i.e. knee-jerk reactions -- are due more credit than we give them.

It was not my intention in this final version to single out Pense as a sole proprietor of his comments; their nature embraces the unspoken and unposted voices of many. As well, all of us have had such reactions and framed them with similar boundaries. The post served as an effective medium with which to address issues and methods that surface time and again in posts that want for a motive, a rational delineation, and/or a specific intention, but somehow fall short of all three; in the process casting a vote and creating an unseen ballot for which we have no effective tally. In short, if the boot fits - wear it.

I was taught as a writer and poet to create your art and let it speak for itself. Let others comment and experience the work and add nothing, your work was done. But the latest post by Pense reaches out not just to Intervals (referred to as Interloper in the post) and Hans-like struggles that include many units, but it encompasses - through intention or not - the whole idea of a wargame's construction and our interaction with the creation. I am compelled to add my comments and questions. While not defending specific scenarios, I am proffering a defense for the legitimate expectation of reasonable and rational process. Like Pense I agree that, aside from an obvious emotional outburst, concerns and complaint should be accompanied with illustration or specifics with regard to their origins. It is definitive for all of us and hints at genuine and observable matters. When beginning a critical inquiry that seeks clarification, it is essential to enter the process slowly being especially careful not be unclear oneself. I will doubtless fail at the attempt to eliminate such occurrences herein, but will, in the process, hope to minimize them. By the way, sarcasm is not highlighted. If you can't tell, call it a flaw in my Long Description. After all, I designed this page.

The pseudo-dialogue:

I've re-read the post a few more times and frankly I don't understand the points you're trying to make. In part because you don't make them with specific references (re: a single scenario or a global assessment), and partly because what I can identify as postulation doesn't appear to be in keeping with the rationale of the game -- which is to provide a conflict setting in which, with the tools you're given, plan and design a strategy that results in optimal performance based on the situation, your talents, and as well -- the limitations of either the terrain, enemy, information, deployment schedule, unit selection, or basic skills. I am at a loss to see how a position can be taken so adamantly in opposition to this 'natural law' of the wargaming experience: There is you, there is them.

For instance, "As a General, I don't like to be told that I have to put units that are not of my choice in a location that is not of my choice. I like having options."

What's that about? That's not a General taking command of a conflict, it sounds more like a patron asking for a menu with items more suited to the palette. In TPG2, you eat what's put on your plate. No one expects every, or for that matter any, scenario to be delivered in the same soothing fashion as mother's milk. Otherwise, why even bother with a reinforcement schedule? Design the scenario as the opponent, then let the player put his own reinforcement schedule together to complete the task. Remember to allow for a regional reinforcement that encompasses the full map to avoid any complaint that the conflict takes place somewhere not of your choosing. Complete choice and total options isn't a wargame, it's a gimme -- Gimme what I want or don't wanna play. You have that right. Avoid Set Piece Setups. If a scenario is not listed in that category but resembles one upon execution, quit. Too much probability is weighted that you'll explain performance in a light of limitations (which is the character of the scenario) and a complaint will be lodged in the fashion of one concerned that a garbage can might collect something, i.e. something it was designed to do.

Another. "In scenarios like Interloper V (actually Intervals but corrected in another post), sometimes I feel like I am being manipulated. Like endgame has decided where and when the battles would happen. And how."

Forgive me if I'm way off base here, but in a sense, isn't that any designer's role? In this case, you have your choice of three starting regions among six and the only unit you don't have at your disposal is the engineer, which is fundamental to the problem the scenario seeks to resolve. Should you deem them important to your strategy, consideration is included to provide for their appearance. So, where it will happen is the map based on a player's selection of the entire region north of a river. How it will happen is a function of a player's decision to use river crossings or initial direct confrontation. Or ... maybe you really did mean Interloper V -- in this case.

"... if you're playing though a pre-designed conflict, like in an historical scenario, it is burdensome on a General when faced with the unknown and being roped into a reinforcement schedule that he has to deal with with his hands tied behind his back."

I suppose that's true in the sort of scenario you describe, an historical where re-living the experience outweighs the ability to exercise options -- but where does this fit in? Are you saying that both Bobb's and my scenario and Hans' resemble historical scenarios in their limitations? If that be the case, I'd ask you to support it with more specifics than you've laid out here.

"Tactical planning becomes impossible. Strategic planning becomes, at best, guesswork. Or is it the other way around."

Here again, I can't tell specifically what's being addressed. Is it the historical scenario again, or is this a vent of frustration after less than expected results on first play? I remain an advocate of the pure experience of first play and the elements it exposes in us, but only after many repeated plays can we move toward any disposition of what is and is not possible in the two scenarios you originally introduced.

Like the 'It Sucks' post, if the planning is impossible or strategy is guesswork tell us how, where, and under what type of circumstances. Otherwise the banter is not so dissimilar to the unknown enemy that seems to be the target of your complaints.

Perla, in his Art of Wargaming, remarks (and I paraphrase) "that the player (in professional wargames, I like to think serious hobbyists as well) must understand that their decision-making processes are the key subjects of the games' investigation or instruction."

Personally, I have to wonder how any designer could limit options to such a degree that the decision-making process is reduced to the deprivation of player status. That includes the indiscriminate and unannounced use of mines -- interesting on first play, objective or hurdle on second attempt, and so on. A learning curve as an enjoyable experience? A subjective one. Some scenarios I don't choose to play twice because of the 'experience', but doubtful more study would not include insights or new ideas about how to approach the conflict that did not arise during the virgin encounter. In that respect, it's a "wanna" factor. How much do I "wanna" go through it again to find out? That, good soldier, is as immeasurable and unpredictable as a woman's favorable mood, or in this case -- ours.

"I am starting to think that all of us get very different things out of this game. And that's good. I like an intellectual edge, others like all out battles, which I like too, but, I have to question a scenario that has umpteen tanks ripe for artillery pulverizing with nowhere to go once the bridges are blown that just takes time... And then what?"

I need some help here on two issues minimum: what's an intellectual edge and how does one achieve that or know he has one? I also am curious about the blown bridges allusion. Are we talking Intervals here again? Is that what happened? Did you successfully blow all the bridges and trap the massive Blue force behind the rivers and hold him to his camps? How did the game end? Did you win then? I can't imagine a scenario within Intervals that allowed that without an attempt by Blue to build some of his own along the way, but if that happened let us know. The last time I played a scenario where all the bridges were blown and then it was clean-up time was Guerre du Vin. But that was an element that provided a useful avenue for strategy. If it happened in Intervals, it shouldn't have and I'm curious about the process that allowed it to occur. Expand.

Another observation. What does it mean to 'question' a scenario? Does that infer it should not have been submitted, that it has no meaning or credibility if it consists of a struggle with a lack of clear victory for either side? What place does conflict alone have in our community, a place of disregard or disfavor? Somewhere in this statement lies the question, the 'why' of war. One can question whether it was intended to be entertaining, challenging, or provoke one to further investigation - most certainly. Can it be questioned about its right to exist? The designer intended 'something', the least of which your willingness to fight the fight. Perhaps, he intended 'umpteen tanks ripe for artillery pulverizing.' Sometimes the Cracker Jacks don't have a secret decoder ring inside. Sometimes it's just a box of Cracker Jacks. That's wrong?

"Invade over the ridge with infantry units? In three areas through the mountains? Who is trying to do what, I guess, is my question. And why is it so scripted? That LA that blew away one unit of my reinforcement across the river from it did not impress me. I lost one Engineer, the other two were spread out and survived, as did the other unit, though shrapnel kept him immobile. Why? Why did you script a reinforcement, then try and blow it up? That makes me crazy... Mabey that's why..."

What ridge? What scenario? And the who's trying to do what is usually laid out in the LD or through your own play. The commander's role is to decide at least what he's trying to do, and the enemy seldom provides a program for the show (unless you're playing a scenario from the original game package.) As you've often said a General usually has one or two clear paths of choice which with he can pursue his greatest chances of success and it takes a certain style of general to find them immediately or demonstrate the persistence to seek them out over an extended number of plays. Okay, I paraphrased. But it's thematic of your ideology in regard. And if it's the LA in Intervals, it is a premature leap to the designer's hand assigning blame or praise -- it's a random unit placement in a rather large region. Where it is, what it does, are acts of the enemy "with choices." Yeah, the engineer 'randomly' showed up where he did too but those are more than choices, they're raw circumstance - an unavoidable product in conflict.

"I like giving the player every option that he would have had in a given scenario as if it had really happened."

This one is problematic in the context of the post's entirety. On the one hand, it lends itself well to the 'historical' creation and in spirit to the construction of any given wargame or any scenario we might examine. The options are dictated by the course of what really happened or in a designer's imagination, what he wishes to prevail -- options included, limited as necessary. On the other hand, in light of the rest of your commentary, it seems what you really mean to say here is 'every option he could have had. Less than that would be, by what I perceive to be your perspective, too limiting; restricting unfairly your choices and consequently, your chances. Which is it? What if what really happened was a conflict of limited options?

"..I think, the player should expect a reasonable game. A challenge. Not 8 million tanks vs. 8 million tanks. Anybody can grind away at that and somebody will win. The player will waste a lot of time."

It's apparent to me that what you expect is a reasonable chance at a win. What a waste of time if we don't have winning possibilities? I suspect that even the glutton of tanks overwhelming the fields equally matched have lessons to unravel. Does the terrain perform as a defensive weapon? Does the bridge north of the main battle 'always' have to fall to the enemy? How many tanks does it require to take the battle south of the little city in the middle? How many more times am I willing to experiment with this one, that one, until I can walk away with the belief (and that's just what it is) that I've gleaned all I can from this one? What we walk away from is our 'desire' to persist in our inquiries. And yes, the designer's in part a party of responsibility if he obscures too well his subtleties; not so deep they will never be found and not laying upon the surface so as to deprive the player of any sense of accomplishment. It is a delicate balance achieved by few, but I believe our aim in design as often is victory our aim as players.

"I'm not saying that Interloper V is like that. It isn't. Nor am I saying that Han's and Kev's scenario is like that. But, both have something in common...."

But you go on to say just that.

"...You are required to demolish...destroy...large numbers of armored units for no apparent reason. Artillery gets boring, after a while. So do airplanes."

I can think of one apparent reason. If you don't they will destroy you. Those that are less than obvious, assumed to exist, require further study and play. Kev's a resident practitioner of tactical studies. I'm not so sure that what I've previously called 'obsession' might not indeed be a proper and logical framework with which to aggressively evaluate, over an extremely long testing period, a scenario's appreciative elements - specifically in those areas that can instruct us, enliven our sense of alternative thinking, and pose new avenues for further experimentation. Incidentally, artillery and planes? Boring? You must have not felt that way playtesting Kosovo. Or is it just when you have to use it strategically to manipulate enemy forces and provide appropriate cover for LOS when you're moving an offensive convoy toward its objective? If that were a scenario's method that resulted in success, would it be conceived of as too limiting, or does it simply lack a certain entertainment value? I agree, we all want different things from the game -- question remains, what exactly do YOU want? If we eliminate limitations, provide obvious or relatively obvious objectives, do it without using an 'army' of units, and allow the player a reasonable chance of securing a victory in the process, I think that's solitaire. You play that one alone.

"One of the most interesting games I ever played here...Scot's Anzio. But, I didn't know it when I was playing it ... I learned much later."

My point exactly. Time allows us the best view of these creations along of course with our initial emotional reactions. Again I quote Perla: "A wargame must be interesting enough and playable enough to make its players want to suspend their inherent disbelief, and so open their minds to the learning process. It must also be accurate enough and realistic enough to make sure that the learning that takes place is informative and not misleading." Akin more to an inquiry over time, these lessons are learned with repeated looks at the same setting through different sets of eyes. I even grew to look at your post with a more diplomatic and methodical frame of mind after reacting to it with a rather emotional outburst on my initial read. It should serve to show that initial reaction without benefit of explanation is likely to create monsters of the same mold.

"...it's all good."

There. We agree on something.

The game only offers so many tools, even with the generous amount of creativity available to us from our colleagues. What we do with them results in portrayals of our uniqueness, our ability to adapt both individually and collectively to preferences and trends that don't always suit specific styles. It is surprising to me that so few, if any, scenarios that have been submitted to our pages have not been in the vein of "it's been done before, just a different setting." In the array of selections that have graced us, most have suffered from neglect and more have endured criticisms and praises from single soldiers, isolated experiences; no testament of glory that the designer spends hours, days, or weeks upon his creation only to see it summed up, stamped, and numbered in the short order of one man's three hour tour with cries of, "Too much of this, too little of that." Enough is enough.

If you've had enough of me, so be it. Obviously others have found other pages or games. You or I can follow their lead. There must be something attractive about the MIA camp, wherever it might be. Maybe it has no limitations and will be full of choices, offering entertainment every damn day of the week ---- a hedonist's land where only pleasure matters and where the play's an experience of only our own designs.

References to Perla are from The Art of Wargaming by Peter P. Perla
Naval Institute Press 1990

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