So why did the Army of Northern Virginia fall short of victory at the Battle of Gettysburg? History has shown that "He who gets there first with most wins!" (A quote by Confederate General Nathon Bedford Forrest) Why didn't this happen for the southern army? And who is to blame? Or is anyone to blame?

Lee's Army was certainly more concentrated at Gettysburg at the beginning of the battle than his counterpart. Some historians believe that there was an opening for Lee and his army at the end of the first day with a flanking maneuver onto Culp's Hill. Ewell who's Corps was in that position didn't take advantage of it. Why? Perhaps it was because Culp's Hill was already occupied by the time Ewell had forces in position to do something about it. Members of Ewell's staff reported after their (perhaps faulty) reconnaissance that Culp's Hill, southeast of town, was left unoccupied. From this commanding position Confederate Artillery could rain death on the heads of the northern army. After being at the battlefield and spending some time on Culp's Hill I wonder if a man on a horse could have ridden up those heights. Culp's Hill is steep rocky and tree covered, certainly more so today than then, but still...

Some historians give a different reason. Ewell had been a subordinate of Stonewall Jackson until the latters death at Chancellorsville. "Old Jack" didn't leave his subordinates much room for free thinking. He told them where to go, what to do and when to do it. This is not a breeding ground for superior generals. But Jackson's intention was not to train his replacement. Ewell, they say, needed guidance from his superior. Even though without supervision he had fought a brilliant campaign through Pennsylvania up to that point. But instead of taking the hill on his own initiative, he wanted to wait for Lee to direct him as now Lee was on the scene and after all Lee was the commanding general.

Lieutenant General James "Old Pete" Longstreet is blamed by history for many of the failures of the Confederate Army and not just Gettysburg. The first thing that Longstreet is blamed for is not attacking at dawn on the second day. His attack started at 4pm that afternoon. Most of Longstreet's Corps had started the day in the Cashtown/Chambersburg area, in some cases as far as 25 miles away from the battlefield. Lee did not make a decision to attack until 8am that morning. How was it possible for Longstreet to begin an attack before it was ordered?

I do wonder why Longstreet didn't pursue his own ideas further. As a Corps commander he had some freedom of action. On the second day he easily could have attacked up the Emmittsburg Road with one division (freezing Ewell's Corps in that position) while flanking around the Round Tops with the other. I have seen it suggested that the reason Longstreet followed Lee's orders to the letter on the second day is because he was upset with his ideas being cast aside so quickly, as Longstreet did with Law's recommendation for a flanking maneuver.

On the third day, Pickett's Charge, again Longstreet is blamed for the failure by not coordinating his attack on the center with Ewell's subordinate Johnson's attack on Culp's Hill. The Army of the Potomac began their counterattack on Culp's Hill at 4:00am on the third day of the battle, hours before Longstreet was to launch Pickett's Charge.

Other historians believe, and I'm sure that the readers of this south of the Mason-Dixon line will have a problem with this, is that the fault lies at the top. Great victories are always credited to the man in command of the army. Great losses are also blamed on them. So why is it that Lee is not blamed for this loss? He blamed himself? Who can forget Lee's comment to his soldiers as they returned from their failed attack on the center of the Federal lines on the third day of the battle, "It's all my fault."

I have spent the last two years studying maneuver warfare theory. Even in this day and age the cavalry are the eyes and ears of the army. Lee's orders to his cavalry general Stewart were ambiguous at best. Paraphrasing, "Find the Union Army, report their position, cut their lines of communication if practiciple." Stewart like most men that rise to that level of command want to glorify their name. He disappeared from communication with the Army of Northern Virginia for seven critical days. Lee was deprived of his eyes and ears. He had no idea of the position or the strength of the Union Army in his front. Still it is unclear if Stewart's presence would have made any difference.

One of the clear teachings of maneuver warfare theory is that you never give battle on the ground of your enemy's choosing. I'm sure that Lee knew this. But with a supply train that was 40 miles in length and having no cavalry to report on the position and strength of his opponent or to provide cover for the supply train, Lee had no option for maneuver, in his mind he was forced to give battle where he stood. Lee also had supreme confidence in his army, severely out numbered Lee and his army had won victory after victory. Here again at Gettysburg Lee was sure that his army would prevail as they had done many times.

On the Union side, many credit Meade with the victory. But as Lee had said the commanding general leads the troops to the enemy and then it's up to the subordinate officers to see the fight through to victory, there is not much a commanding general can do once the fighting begins. Meade's great decision here was to stand and fight.

While many historians give credit and blame to the commanding generals of both sides, I believe there was a different reason for the outcome of the three days of fighting on that hallowed ground.

The Army of Northern Virginia had never been this far into enemy territory before. The Army of the Potomac had and they had experienced the hostility of the locals, the guerilla action in their rear, the long lines of communication and supply. This would be the first time the southern army would experience that. The southern army had fought well and had many successes defending their towns, homes, farms, and fields from the invaders.

Living off the land and foraging had to have taken a toll on the discipline of the Confederate forces. Discipline that would be required by an army to engage and dislodge an enemy in a fortified position. Meanwhile for the first time the Union army was fighting on its home soil. The morale of the individual northern soldier played perhaps the critical role in the battle. This was his home the enemy was in and he was going to hold this ground at all costs and drive the Rebels from it. Which Army of the Potomac did.