|
If you been following my writings for some time, you'll know that I've been writing about Jomini and Clausewitz for over a year now. These are two greatly learned men that share at least one thing in common; they attempted to study the greatest general in history and teach us what it was that he did that made his results so great. Who is this great man that was their source of strategy and tactics? Napoleon. I've been reading David G. Chander's The Campaigns of Napoleon. Napoleon wrote that he didn't have any strategy, that's not true, he only said that to confuse his subordinates and mostly his enemies. His strategy was so flexible that it could adapt to a highly changing battlefield. He had many great successes that gave him decisive results, most notably in his campaign against the Third Coalition in 1805. The Grande Armée was organized into five corps. Each completely independent and self contained. Each corps consisted of the three arms; Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery. While moving the Grande Armée into a position to make contact with the enemy, they were widely separated. But not so much so that there was no more than a one or two days march between any of the corps. This would miss lead his enemy's into not knowing for sure what his intended target was and they would have to spread out their forces in an effort to cover all the possible threats. This only served to weaken their position and would allow the French forces to destroy them in detail. Because as the Grande Armée neared it's intended victim, it would begin to concentrate on that position. There are several advantages to the concentration of one's forces; Shorter lines of internal communication, all the forces available can be used simultaneously, the reduction of casualties, and the ability to conduct a pursuit. The best way to describe the formation of the Grande Armée is to think of it as a baseball diamond. A corps represented by each base, the reserve was at home plate and the pitcher's mound was the Imperial Guard. As the Grande Armée moved it was led by the advanced guard of 'second base', with 'first base' guarding the right flank and 'third base' guarding the left. If the enemy was contacted at 'third base', that corps became the advanced guard and the corps at 'first base' the reserve, shifting the duties of guarding the left and right flanks to 'home plate' and 'second base', respectively. Because each corps was self contained, it could easily hold off an enemy of several times it's size while the rest of the army moved up. At first when one looks at the tactics that Napoleon used one would think that he believed in strength on strength, but what he was really attacking is what he called the "hinge" of the position. It was this tactic that led to Napoleon's great victory against the Third Coalition at Jena. The Prussian General's didn't like each other, and were afraid that one of them might get more glory than himself. They didn't support each other well on the battlefield and would leave gaps or weak support between their lines. Napoleon exploited this, first by a devastating artillery barrage on that weak spot, then an infantry charge through the reeling lines, followed by a cavalry charge through the gap. All of which would be supported by at least one end of the enemy's line being out flanked. With that part of the line now surrounded on all sides, a coup de grâce was assured. For those Clausewitz-izens out there, it was at Jena that Clausewitz was captured by the French and then spent two years in a French POW camp. Not a pleasant experience I'm sure. The Grande Armée was more flexible than even this may seem, for as the situation warranted, entire divisions could and would be added and subtracted, as needed, to any particular corps from the reserve or other corps. Meaning that an enemy, even if he knew which of the French corps was on his front, wouldn't or couldn't know for sure their exact strength. Napoleon's favorite tactic was the double envelopment, manoeuvre sur les derriéres. Out flanking his opponent on each side. This was possible because the center of the line would be supported by all three arms, and was very strong. Meanwhile the Reserve and Imperial Cavalry would shield the movement of the flanking forces from the opponent, until it was too late. To me there are at least a couple of lessons to be learned from this. Don't spread your forces out to thin. Maintain decisive fire power on the critical point of the battlefield. That even in TPG2 there are three arms of forces. It seems unfortunate to me that the AI in the game doesn't use the terrain and unit types effectively in the defense, if one could say that it defends at all. Although there have been attempts by several of the scenario designers to overcome this short coming in the AI, through the use of limiting the unit types the AI receives, terrain tricks and reinforcement schedules. I don't mean to continue to slam the game, but one of the military strategies/tactics that we rarely see in this game is the manoeuvre sur les derriéres. Many many times throughout history have great battles been won and lost due to this strategy/tactic. Why not in the game? Mostly due to time, limited space, and limited number units in a particular action. Nor are there any command centers or depots to attack. We attempt to simulate these through reinforcement areas, but not always effectively. It not always our fault, it's inherent in the games design. I realize now that as I play the game and move a unit or two from one platoon to another, that I'm utilizing my own internal lines of communication. Was I doing this before? I'm sure that I was, I just wasn't thinking about it in that way. Nor am I sure that by thinking that way I've increased my tactical abilities. Perhaps just being aware of it I'll make sure that I keep my forces within a turn or two of each other. I'm likely to pack along a little artillery too, just in case. |