The General's Staff Report

Updated on Feburary 5, 2000

What follows is the entirety of a message that I received from Endgame this week, which I share in this forum for your perusal. - Rommel

Rommel: In replying to a request from Pense to consider the original conception of Outside the Line of Sight, I inadvertantly returned to an early summation (the introduction that follows) that elucidated the evolution. Consequently, I re-read this page. Forwarding it you with the intention that you post it at your convenience as a Staff Report for a couple of reasons. 1) This submission contains some outstanding thoughts gathered from participants in the referenced Debriefing worthy of review. 2) It, potentially, may revive my interest in reprising the page as well as provoking the interest of those currently participating to implement some of the ideas contained herein and/or attend Debriefings to engage in the exchanges available there.

This submission, retrospectively, betrays the better side of our thinking as a community and inspires at a minimum: hope.

**Sidenote: I was surprised to find the characterization of "the visiting Bobb" to describe our own General Barrow. Once atop an observation post, he now commands not only the troops with authority and confidence, but more importanly -- our attention.

**Sidenote: With the revitalization of River Scenarios e.g. Cross the River by Hans, Alco by Safer, Intervals by EG & Bobb, and recently the remarkable Rain of Steel ----- it seems most appropriate to revisit this selection on RIVER CROSSINGS.

Feel free to include these introductory comments with the submission and as always, hard as it can be, Wage On!

Respectfully,

ColEndgame

It wasn't my original intention for this section to serve as the Debriefing Recap (DEBRECON), but the discussions that occur during these IRC sessions do, in a real sense, fall outside the line of sight of the Guestbook reader and for those Generals who are unable or have elected not to participate. In keeping with Rommel's rationale that our community provide full LOS and that central to strong development is providing and maintaining open and effective lines of communication - in the interim this is an appropriate arena. Rommel willing and space permitting, at some point in the future an "Even Further Outside" link will be added following the recap (available until the next one), wherein other obscurities will be examined.

I have not allocated the resources or energies to relate to you here the history of the Debriefing, formerly referred to as IRC night, but suffice to say the gathering evolved into a form and substance that Rommel and I, in those isolated evenings when our theoretical discussions would quickly deteriorate into casual conversation, held only as unrealized ambitions. The quality, quantity, and flavor of both participants and subject matter has most certainly risen above those early expectations. A consistent collection of competent and often analytical Generals conspire to exchange ideas and opinion ranging from intricate discussions on multiple bridge crossings in river offensives to suggested stratagems in working stages being employed in current scenario engagements.

Having reached this culmination, it becomes a disservice not to aim the sentry's beacon outside the line of sight and relay its findings. Whether entertaining, intense, casual or argumentative, structured, unstructured, for the scholar or unlettered - my mission is reflective first of events and consequently the betrayal of my own volition. Integrating the theories of dialogue and conversation is a relatively simple but arduous task. When the "assimilation of these theories results in constructing scenarios to demonstrate them", well stated by Anonymous General, we will have reached an essential new objective and our community will have positioned my role "even further outside" its present view. Until then...

Note: Every session includes its moments of apology, most unnecessary. Among them the participant new to IRC in advance of his understandable adjustment period, spelling errors by old and new alike, late arrivals, severed connections, reconnections, the infamous "lag" that delays the sender's messages to and from the forum, forgotten scenario titles or forgotten scenario authors, and the occasional spontaneous outburst of either vulgarity or absurdity, or lack of preparation for the event.

The first and last should be addressed while all between should be, from this point forward, assumed forgiven and beyond mention. New participants are above all desired and welcomed. If you manage to execute the program necessary to arrive at the mIRC channel, the rest is downhill. The basics are: type your message, hit the enter key - all anyone can expect. Relax. Assistance in using mIRC is available upon request from either Rommel or Pense - simply email them.

As for prerequisites or preparations for the event itself, there's only one criteria: none. I know, Rommel sends out a mass email indicating what might be discussed, but who knows and for how long? If a certain scenario ends up being discussed, so what? If you haven't played it listen, take notes, wait until the subject changes, change the subject, plan for when you DO play it, or wait for your screensaver to activate and pray we won't be long. Think of it as a Drew Shorter scenario: there will be plenty of chances to reinforce. If you don't want to say anything, don't. Fortify in a free city and wait for turn 17. Again, relax. Okay, long note. I'm learning how to use some new html coding. By now, you're practiced at using the scroll bar. "Sergeant, load 'em up!"

Rommel's anticipated five minutes of discussion, preceded by posts in the Guestbook on the same issue, resulted in far more than that in the many ideas put forward in the evening's exchanges. What follows are individual point summaries, a synopsis of central ideas presented, debated, discussed. In most cases I have omitted crediting the presenter. Various authors of principles of war and can be located under Readings at the end of this page. While much of the discussion can be credited to the initiatives of individual research by the participants, the degree of originality in tactics and strategies relative to actual game play must defer to your judgment and practice.

In multiple river crossings there is general agreement that at least one of the other crossings must be diversionary, drawing some reaction from the enemy - away from your principle concerns or primary objective;

That the split forces, regardless of the divisions, should remain within a geographical reference close enough to lend support to each other.

The diversionary force will, as a rule, contain less forces while the more numerous and stronger units move toward central objectives.

Combinative strategies in river crossings may include flank attacks while using terrain advantages, coupled with artillery to open lines of movement and surgical airstrikes.

River crossings against the computer AI (Earl) can provoke responses based on whether 1) Earl has LOS on the units crossing and 2) whether the bridge threatens a reasonably important objective i.e. victory point, airport, or reinforcement region.

The creation of bridges affect Earl's potential to target them for movement destinations. One might conclude that the more bridges built, the more likely Earl would be to choose a wrong path. Seemingly, the final hex count would be the determinant, with Earl choosing the economical path. Parking a unit on a bridge, provided Earl "sees" it, can prevent him from evaluating its location as a option during his movement planning. Fortified units on a bridges are persuasive deterrents IF it doesn't blockade a victory point, e.g. city entry. Choices expand to storming the bridge with outside fire and armored assaults.

Prepare for building bridges or moving onto or across them during night turns when the only "zones of control" activate. Careful examination and accurate reconnaissance of enemy units is integral to this maneuver. When opposing units move within a hex of the bridge, movement will be halted. On the other hand, if a determination has been made that enemy units will not be able to reach the crossing point by the time the bridge is built, then attacking forces will be able to initiate an unopposed advance.

River configurations are both strategic keys and tactical considerations. For instance when attacking across a long-spanning river, the opponent's likelihood of separating his forces by greater distances can possibly be increased. Long straight rivers command a more linear front while twisting, winding, or broken rivers demand platoon assignments. Surrounding terrain at bends or breaks may dictate unit selection or plan. Jomini suggests the best place to cross a river (from a tactical vantage) is when it makes a V-shape. At this apex, the attacking forces are able to achieve cross fire on the enemy should he mobilize to delay or eliminate bridge building efforts. Note: My visual interpretation of this tactic is one opposite of the wedge formation, but rather attacking at the nearest point of an opposing river-formed wedge, enabling flanking mobility to continue encroachment by friendly troops to better position "wedge-contained" enemy targets.

Cross the river with advance units consisting of bazookas and machine guns in order to dispose of or hold back the enemy. An armored gunner may assist from the crossing side. This strategy becomes a viable tactic if the enemy composition has previously been identified as foot soldiers, but may have a limitation if no recon has been established or armor resistance surfaces.

Multiple river assaults should be clearly divided. Not haphazard forays with no forethought or coordination. Two muddled assemblies, although close enough to lend combative support, do not constitute an orchestrated contact or diversionary maneuver. Distinction is imperative to purpose.

The practicality of building many bridges is questionable. Are they built because initial entry points were met with opposing fire? Is the intention to enhance the fluidity of troop movement? Is it a result of utilizing an engineer's tempo while already occupying the river? Note: If we trust Clausewitz's presumption that "war is a continuation of politics by other means," we might infer also that war is essentially purpose. Would we then build even one isolated bridge in its absence?

River crossings, in a numerous unit scenario, can form huge chokepoints. What preparations are necessary for the eventuality of these bottlenecks? Timely relief schedules of new bridge constructions can offer alternatives for tactical flanking maneuvers and unit diversion.

Destroying bridges meets with mixed opinion from those who consider the act unnecessary in most scenarios to those who routinely assign demolitions. A careful examination of terrain and purposeful direction or misdirection of enemy troops seems the deciding factor.

River crossings temporarily halt your army's progress. By definition they are often low and in open terrain. As a result, the occupation can mean the creation of a volatile and vulnerable tactical situation. The finer points of the premise can be argued, but what arises is an echo of Jomini's first assertion: an army is only as strong as the force that comes into combat. The reduction of immediate forces available for active conflict is immeasurable in light of so many "situational" factors, but the theme is relatively clear. If the enemy can achieve more encounters with favorable odds (number of active and firing units) than the assailing force, then the rapid mobilization of troops must ensue or a contingency plan implemented to establish another, more appropriate, location for crossing.

Another vulnerability associated with a split river crossing is, having divided your forces, the opponent can initiate his own flanking maneuvers targeting weaker positions and bring to bear superior force. In planning for this threat one should approximate the relative strength and mobility of the opponent's anticipated counter force and insure that the fractured division measure equally resistant.

Note: Clausewitz offers a reasonable summary of principles designed with the dynamic and pliant general in mind. No battle lasts very long at a river. One side usually decides to carry it to one side or bring it to the other. Whoever does so with the most foresight, intuitiveness, and adequate number of troops wins. River crossings are often overrated. Although they do slow down the attacker, it is largely because he believes he will arrive at a difficult situation. Historically, the successful defense of a river remains the exception rather than the rule.

Of course, Earl is the guest in attendance by proxy. His ghost looms ever present in our discourse. At times in wait of blatant categorizations, at others inexplicably evasive or unpredictable. What remains constant is his lack of formidable defense: in scenario play and often mirrored within the message of our commentaries, our condescension is unanswered, not rebuked, and found by default to have merit.

Personally, I don't share the low position and favor found in Earl. We serve more Corporals and Captains, than Majors and Generals. For those of us still dissecting and digesting the gradual clarifications expounded by our distinguished comrades, Earl still proves a reasonable foe, and in many cases, aside from our own limitations, our only one.

Increasing talents of our designers coupled with developing understanding of Earl's rationale and inner-workings is creating a wealth of innovative new territory wherein we begin our marches, point our guns, and assign our crafts destinations. Rommel points out astutely, "Earl's toughness is really in the hands of the scenario creator."

I would not advocate that we cease and desist our Earl bashing propensities any more than I would suggest we bestow upon him honors. Our estimations of both his constant and dynamic qualities are the roughest stones upon which the lapidary practices the polished art.

Earl's fundamental flaw: Every unit acts for itself, and Earl divides his units between all objectives. His units are therefore independent, seldom functioning as an army or unified force.

Earl works methodically: wanting to capture most, if not all, victory point locations. He does this by robo-clicking them as destinations. His movement is divided into two phases. First moving for targeted objectives. Second, burning up what remains of his movement allowances with belligerent moves: Assaults, closing for shots, etc. airports airports airports. Note: One particular maneuver Earl does not employ, but I have used on more than one occasion unknowingly is the Austrian ohschitt movement of an infantry unit exiting a victory point exhausting any allowance to return there. To my knowledge, humans alone execute this blunder.

When units occupy bridges and Earl gets LOS, he can no longer autoroll to his destination. At least not that way. He either shunts his units to a different route If a new bridge has been built far from the original sight he is redirected. Or he waits for the end of his movement phase and expends his remaining points on the aforementioned tactical maneuvering.

Line of sight regarding these "occupying units" can be further expounded. If the elephant tank parked on the bridge remains unseen, the calculation of available routes remains unaltered. When units enter the line of sight, they become effective blockades and the auto-course plotting engine will calculate a route that does not include that bridge. This is inclusive of those units that have been spotted, are now out of sight, but have not moved.

New bridges are immediately integrated into Earl's routing calculations. Knowing about the bridge, he takes it into account. Upon arriving at the bridge and spying it enemy-occupied, he no longer takes it into account. The exception being his election to eliminate the unit and continue.

An understanding of Earl's weaknesses and tendencies is a function of time and observation, investment and assessment. With many plays of scenario, patterns can be discerned, lessons learned. Anyone can improve their rank after continuous exposure.

Earl will come to you. Patience and static strategy is an element of war. Soon to be addressed in an upcoming Rommel's Ramble.

Tactics can be executed with a degree of high confidence level unless the enemy knows or is familiar with the tactics. Earl has no "recollection" of his last encounter so is prone to repeat his reactions to your maneuvers. The variant in repetitive responses is affected largely by his initial unit selections. Note: For variant responses to repeat plays, try selecting another playing level for Earl. If Compu5 is routine, try Compu3.

Earl's nature, as mentioned is to spread his forces out to effectively address the number of victory points and priorities available to him. His exact priorities are still a matter of research and discussion. Practice seems to indicate that with enough mobile artillery, necessity to spread far is more limited. Note: Recent play of Pense's Guerre du Vin served to remind me that the mobile artillery unit, as an independent, will often neglect victory points for position. The shoot-and-scoot movement prevails over the score-is-more intelligence.

With little or no rhyme or reason, Earl often destroys bridges and roads. The occasional airstrike targeting bridges does not occur with enough consistency to favor Earl with intention with regard to these various acts of destruction.

Road blockades force Earl to employ less comfortable routes. Although he may enjoy more advantageous attacking terrain, his movement will be slowed and your mobility is usually enough to out maneuver him.

Destroy Earl's fast units first. The first phase toward fixing his forces to a more coordinated focus of attack.

Devise to keep a path open through to the rear of your main assaulting force. Earl will be provoked to continue flanking maneuvers against you.

If an Engineer isn't engineering, you've wasted potential. Based on game length and terrain, always be alert to the engineer's possibilities: to clear forest for more rapid movement of heavier units toward objectives, building fortresses to secure even temporary positional strongholds. Any mine near a vital chokepoint may misdirect Earl for a turn and therefore turn the tide of that conflict. The engineer's additional capabilities are dreadfully slow, but within the context of an extremely long game, limited travel without decent roads or effective railways, his use should be carefully evaluated.

Engineers can be left back to destroy bridges or lay mines to protect against Earl's rear attacks on multiple fronts once an advance is passed. Earl sends his engineers out to tear up roads in his rear areas, unaware whether or not a rear threat exists.

It has been suggested that in scenario design Earl be excluded from the purchase of engineers as he lacks ability to use them properly. Illusions of effective engineers can be created using one event solely to construct fortresses in surgically placed locale.

The term "appropriate lethal compositions" merits examination. The lethal effectiveness measure of platoon engagement and assignment can be gauged by comparison of the forces in conflict. Preferably, mechanized infantry - cavalry - targets infantry assaults while armor confronts armor with a discretionary amount of anti-tank soldiering forces. The basis of evaluation remains the potential for lethal fire, or fire expenditure in terms of chances. The idea is maximize your lethal potential and minimize the enemy's. Aim for positions that allow the majority of your frontline forces to exert firepower in a given fire phase, while minimizing enemy opportunity to do the same.

When keeping your army in one group does not afford you any significant increase in lethality due to space/terrain limitations, splitting up may prove a strategic alternative.

Improving your own mobility often improves the enemy's as well when changing or altering terrain. But reducing the enemy's mobility does not necessarily mean a proportionate reduction is your own.

The recon map doesn't tell you what kind of unit you have, but it does serve in the initial phase to offer terrain suggestions about which units to purchase.

Light tanks are good all around units. Almost without exception the unit most recommended for high value and large quantity. The medium tank is regarded as high in return on investment, but quantity should be more limited. Armored machine guns are invaluable for rapid victory point occupation and quick recon function.

Airpower strategies can be complex and difficult to use correctly. Aiding the target assessments are probabilities. 33% when the units are covered. That is, in forests, hillsides, towns and the like.

During my continual review and research of archived and current Guestbook posts I have concluded that Gen. Shorter, with his "Across the River" was the first to introduce into the forums the idea that Earl does not move to attack territories beyond the river's limits until a bridge is built. Drew actually tilled the ground upon which Dano's "Bridge in Time" was constructed.

Gen. Shorter surmised the rationale behind his predilection and reputation for creating scenarios with many reinforcement events, and almost without exception cities that reinforce and rollover points, "It's hard to recover from purchasing mistakes when you only get one shot at buying stuff."

A nearly universal consensus exists on infantry scenarios being slow and relatively boring. Studies in slower moving compositions with successful results include Merkur, A Very Small Place, and the Korean War Series.

On Shorter's "Across the River," Anonymous General pronounced it classic. "Once the bridge is built, Earl comes full bore on top of you. The trick is to stick a whole bunch of bazooka by that first bridge. Then he comes. Leave a path through your troops, otherwise Earl doesn't care about the units once he gets into firing rage. Build a second bridge down at the other end, and cross uncontested. (Note: If I understand this point, it relates directly to the same tactic referred to earlier provoking Earl's flanking attacks on your rear guard - he must have a visible route).

"Across the River" serves as a good introduction to Shorter's work, complete with reinforcing cities and cumulative reinforcement events.

On Shorter's "Teleport," Anonymous General again with comment, "Simple, quick, violent, and teaches fundamental rules." The combinative powers of enough bazookas can defeat a strong attacking force. And an effective use of the road blockade to inconvenience Earl's route selection.

Pense's "Guerre du Vin" has a new and improved computer opponent version. It has already been heralded as an excellent head-to-head vehicle. Large map, constant maneuvering and division of forces, and rivers serving as chokepoints guarding airfields that are key to pounding opposition forces.

Joe O'Neil remains an under-rated designer with scenarios that, if they are being played, are not sufficiently discussed. Re: Lightning War Campaign. The many "Raid on...." scenarios can be played as stand alone adventures.

In addition to the many types of scenarios available to us and the many differing chemistries of their designers, there also exist various styles of approaching the play of these creations. I would not presume to cover them all, but among them are the start-it-and-finish-it-regardless, the artful maneuver or start-it-if-it-doesn't-work-quit-restart-it, and of course the mythmaker or play-it-learn-it-master-it-then post-about-it.

Most of us use a combination of these techniques or fall somewhere in between. I remain grateful for the contributions of generals willing to discuss their conquests and how they achieved them, as well as those who allow us even in mid-scenario's play to sympathize with their struggle. What results is communication, those essential guidelines that provide us the tools with which to make judgments.

One of the tools we continue to use, but merits a re-examination is the rating system (stars) we assign to scenario review. There is a prevailing notion that the 4 Star and above rating is bestowed much too quickly and generously. A growing faction of players are becoming more demanding of specific criteria for an accurate portrayal of what a scenario entails in terms of its quality and expectations from those who would choose to play.

Categories that have been suggested for addition or resurrection (in order of emphasis or importance - most to least) include: repeat-playability, documentation/long description, accurate reinforcement schedule, concept, map design, and a resulting blended rating that reflects the scenario's overall design qualitatively and composed of distinctive elements rather than an arbitrary "gut-appeal" number of stars.

Anonymous General summarized his feeling about what the aim of scenario reviews should be: "to encourage others to try it and give their opinion, and to help the designer improve his next effort." What do YOU think?

Visiting General Bobb may have said it best, "Battlefields make their own theory. Generals fight battles, theoreticians fight with words." For the many officers who wage warfare rather than opinion nearly to exclusion, fight your fight. But consider offering one signal flare to direct those who would map your terrain a lighted path.

Continue to sign your games. Either in the title or at least within the long description with or without email information. Please include with your uploaded scenario submissions the scenario category.