I have four to five pages of notes, minor diagrams, and assessments of the earliest turns in "A Tough Day." So tough, the early turns were all I noted, as casualties and the seemingly endless numbers of opposition appearing became a focus deserving all my energies; ultimately, to no avail or measurable victory. That is not to say the troops did not have their minor successes, including an early occupation of the southern port and holding the beach position (even though assailed by the enemy in great numbers) late into the engagement; longer than I anticipated.

Of course my nature desires an epoch recreation of the minutia: a bard's song or mesmerizing saga of what transpired on the field. I cannot fulfill the Muse. The passion to absorb, detail the movements, and preserve my own history was overwhelmed by the pure power of the play. This is not a grandiose embrace of the scenario's essence, but more a conviction of the outright dominance of the enemy when unleashed, unbridled against a less than knowing adversary. Choices made with any intention are feeble against the reality unfolding and exposing one's ignorance, by omission, oversight, perhaps uninformed, or ill-prepared. There is no blame or recourse. It is the game, and what is done is done. What is done next will build upon both our victories and our failures.

Evaluating the early drop zones, reported to contain 30 points, I reviewed the recon map for a hint as to what strategy (if any) offered opportunity. The Mervilles Battery caught my eye with its 20 point VP as well as conjuring up images of an artillery depot that may wreak havoc early in the engagement. Machine guns would serve me well with the multiple fire options provided the range was in proximity and LOS was a variable as the turn, of course, had not yet commenced for enemy observation and placement.

Noted that 21 Panzer had immediate access to the rail system and considered the zone nearest an advantage for damaging the rail and slowing their access to assist the central forces. The idea that this would thrust me into the "thick of things" turn 1 made me reluctant to commit early there, but the possibility would outweigh the risk as the decisions were made.

Between Bayeux and the Vire River looked to be another opportunity to damage rails and prohibit early arrival of 17 Panzer. Identical measures could be taken near Caen to the west and provide two zones, at least, in proximity to one another should any remain three or four turns. It was unlikely that any of their numbers would last long. I'd envisioned ACMG and AC streaming out of the woods and, even though a couple of shots would be required, the foot soldiers would not be able to withstand the constant pressure of the surmounting enemy troops.

The initial decision was then made to place two C-Platoons near the Mervilles Battery with one assigned, with a BZ mix, to bunker down in the farm hexes and prepare for any movement through their zones of influence. The A-Platoon would drop near Bayeux and B-Platoon would arrive near Caen. Then, the first surprise. 45 points instead of 30!

This is always a mixed blessing in scenarios. On the one hand, it is always a welcome advantage to receive units above one's expectations. On the other, it causes suspicion of everything that can occur from that point on. What is certain, what can be doubted, what is reliable? Strictly a function of the commander's personality, in this case it played to my historical paranoia. It is a small leap for the fearful commander to doubt first the reliability of his information to soon doubting the reliability of his own decisions. There is no room for second guesses in war. Unfortunately, the present inflicts the wounds long before hindsight heals them.

The decision was made to deploy - 2 ENG with 1 MG each as escort, a 2 BZ/2 MG team, 2 INF each with intentions to occupy a rail hex and fortify to block any enemy mobile unit and protecting the engineer. An additional group of 5 BZ were selected to platoon as needed in low LOS areas.

A-Platoon and B-Platoon each with an ENG, INF, MG, BZ took their positions while C-Platoon was set to occupy farm hexes near enemy forts with 2 BZ, 2 MG. An additional 3 BZ placed at Caen's perimeter in and near woods hexes to spot convoy travel. B-Platoon's ENG would recon the bridge and any wood travel should he survive the early stages.

The engagement commences with C-Platoon splitting into two sub-groups as LOS is obtained on any enemy positions. One spies the foot soldiers, a BZ and MG guarding a nearby LA! The platoon BZs target wood hexes for movement planning support from the southern beach against the fortresses. The other group advances further into the woods fortifying as possible in farm hexes minimizing the effect of any potential artillery.

All platoons deploy as planned occupying rails and seeking the shelter of low impact, defensive hexes. Engineers move to damage rails and protective escorts border them leaving at least a hex or two between them to buffer enemy counter movements. The turn ends quietly down 0-195. Attack plans commence with anticipation of hitting the beach heads where, literally, the uphill battle will ensue.

Fog falls down upon us and limits LOS as deployment considerations for the beach landing begin. 60 purchase points allotted over 5 beaches and slowed to half movement. As an early assault, the combination of limited vision and restricted movement are at the forefront of battle plans. The thought that this duo will continue to thwart aggressive maneuvers weighs heavily on strategies and preserving the drop zone forces, at least protecting them, seems the most reliable endeavor to attempt.

A survey of the assault beaches looking to support or divert any enemy active units nearby the Mervilles Battery favor Sword Beach. B-Platoon, north of Juno/Gold, make its location candidate for artillery or faster mobile units that might join them quickly. C-Platoon would require more commitment to Omaha Beach where LOS on forts and what forces occupy them become disconcerting. Utah Beach could be divided and target St.Vaast Battery with swamp and beach terrain offering a reasonable protective cover for attacks from the anticipated housed artillery. A plan longer in nature than necessary to fully evaluate now, so on to the evaluation of unit selection offering immediate support to short term objectives. Am I acting locally, but thinking globally? Shadows of doubt loom large as the recon map is scanned again wondering what form and composition those Panzer groups will take. I am likely underestimating their numbers, concentration, travel plans or unit mix. Like the chessboard, lies and hypocrisy do not last long, and any shortcoming will certainly be quickly revealed.

I look to LAs, at least one, for Sword Beach and consider the effect of LOS with the fog. Range is now 10 hexes so initial placement must allow me in-target-range as the fog is due immediate return. What about vehicles, even with half-movement, to move north and serve as cut-off decoys and mini-diversions? Access is so limited from central beaches that ENG teams begin to become a valuable consideration. Can the rivers be treated as roads for them until they create an avenue of access for troops following? Would they be up to the task of meeting the Panzer mobile units head on? A convoy of AC or ACMG (likely elements of the Panzer Platoons) would require the ACar units to expend at least 2 shots. This would prove a critical error to assume the degree of AC presence without recon.

Juno Beach would require an ENG team to bridge the next beach for supportive efforts, and Sword Beach would receive the LA. These are the only immediate certainties. A review of Instructions, Rules, and Tactics is in order to confirm artillery ranges, unit attack capabilities, and range of attack by enemy units. It is a rare engagement that drives a commander back to his books. It wouldn't be enough, I was certain. Not with 25 minutes passed, the music (of necessity) turned down to focus, only 2 units decided, and a search for the manual underway. None of this has the indications of victory. The sword seems, somehow, positioned by my own hand to fall upon. There is an element of mood, omission, or readiness that seems insufficient; I cannot determine why.

60 points to deploy on the beaches. Evaluate again, the 10-13 range of light artillery and what effect it may have if deployed in future installments. It becomes a viable target for the enemy and draws him in that much more quickly, but it may serve the 'cut-off' mission that engineers and vehicles are seemingly insufficient to achieve.

Strategies turn to advantages and risks of spreading deployment units and activities across the multiple beach regions. The initial plans consist of 3 MG in Omaha, 19 support points for Sword Beach as platoon protection (3 LT with a 1pt carryover trial), 3 ACMG split in adjacent beaches 2/1 with the aim of taking out forces occupying the fortresses on the hill north of Gold Beach. Add plans to move, from opposing directions, into Port eu Bessin if casualties rate allows. Add ENG team to link the Juno and Gold beach sites. Deploy additional LT into Omaha, and the 3 MG there assist targeting the forts on Gold Hill. Sword Beach deploys the LA, with less risk, in a 13-hex range location accompanied by a foot soldier mix.

Bogged down in analysis. Terrain is too tight and favors the defender in a central push to the north. The decision is made to impact, if possible through the OSA air and naval support, roads and rails to bottleneck enemy travel. A critical decision in that results will require measure by observation (did it hit, where did it hit, what did it do?), and it is likely that human nature and habits will prevail losing sight of calculations/measurements in the heat of battle. A brief consideration is given to increasing unit investment on the eastern beach, but decided that a commitment to eliminate the southern artillery there is a sufficient battle plan. If any aggressive central advance is possible, it hinges on accurate artillery fire, precise off-shore support, and a steady movement of foot soldiers 'off' the beach heads and on to the hillside to offer a defensive line of both observation and fire opportunity. We stay with the plan. It will fail early, demonstrate hope, or prevail.

Assignments of off-shore support offer up question immediately. Speculation results from doubts already in place about information reliability. 5 shots of support during turns 2,3,4,5 means a 5 per turn allotment, or 5 shots distributed over the course of those turns? If there's only an opportunity for one shot now, it must be the one with the highest priority. If additional fires are offered during the same exchange, all the better. But it won't be confirmed until after the series of five shots whether all support has been expended. Initiating the operation can be the only way to know. With hesitation and heightened anticipation, the assignments are given: first shot Caen, then Port support in Bessin, a rail intersection, the road north of A-Platoon, and a defensive attack on the west rails of Mervilles. All five shots assigned, a sure signal that an array of 5 each will be available on each of the subsequent turns. Some relief.

A port light artillery is destroyed, damage is inflicted to a bridge and rail hex north of our C-Platoon, another road hex is damaged in near the central Panzer supply region, and the Caen fire misses - hitting a rail hex within the city so damage results. Reports are favorable for a first strike, but the ultimate test will be the measure of 'effect'. Time will be required for measurement, and time is probably not on our side unless the impact bottlenecks with enough penalty to offset our restricted locations and our own slowed movement. By the time I know, it will already be too late for adjustment. This is a commitment to win or slowly be picked apart by the advancing troops circumventing our feeble obstacles or creating delay points for us as units lodge themselves in place atop the hills awaiting openings for movement.

The notes quickly diminish into scratch observations. The rolling tanks surprise us with their concentration, composition, and sheer numbers. I count 5 Heavy Tanks, at least 4 Medium Tanks, and some faster units, all heading quickly for city hexes just west of center. With 100 points invested in his deployment, the enemy was out to insure victory here. That would leave minimal deployment opportunity for the eastern wings, but I'd already made my commitment to the center and the eastern omission would have to wait for another engagement. I wondered if then, under those circumstances, he would allot more initially on that front. Speculation is no match for adrenaline. The writing was on the wall already if the enemy presence continued to increase in the same proportions in the center. It was obvious that an early surge northward on the eastern edge might not only delay or divert those forces, but with success, actually eliminate their deployment from the supply depot.

... ... ... Buy many, buy mobility, move forward, and hold ground north of the beach on as many hill areas as possible. Confront, deny, and delay the enemy. If his numbers continue to grow in relative deployments, hold the hillside for as long as possible while defensive numbers (in the form of pure INF to occupy VP hexes) deploy and fortify. If the enemy breaks through early with quicker units, plan for immediate retreat.

... ... ... I remember seeing both Heavy and Medium tanks streaming out of the northern supply area. Many turned south into the rough terrain, building up multiple fire opportunities to take out an AC recon or pave the way for mobile artillery sneaking and peeking out of the woodlands. The exchanges at the beach were holding to our advantage, but deployment of light artillery was insufficient - at least insufficient in numbers -- as heavier units rounding the hills found it in their LOS and often eliminated it only a turn or two after it was placed.

... ... ... The eastern attack against the artillery forts (30 points) was successful. A convoy of ACMGs accompanied by an LT made their way into the complex, eliminating the enemy; leaving a platoon of BZ to hold the beach. An INF force was deployed to hold the forts while victorious armor units re-traced their path northward with an aim to hit the roadways and recon congestion in the northeast Panzer convoys. There wouldn't be enough to hold VPs along the way, so a recon was the only option available to them beyond waiting for disaster. Better to find disaster and know death's name. In the southern region, the vacant areas and meager enemy penetration was an obvious rejection of my decision not to deploy more heavily and seek a quick path northward. It was too late to adjust. The enemy was at hard at Omaha, Juno and Gold, breathing hard enough in our faces to require a constant presence just to hold the arena. Eastern points were necessary to carry over for central support in the form of mobile artillery and sufficient BZ numbers to occupy 'any' open hex for additional defense. We would take him as he arrived, unit by unit, a tank at a time. But the numbers were looking greater than our ability to fend them off.

... ... ... Armored cars made a constant run west into the fort complex depriving the enemy of victory points. An enemy LT was allowed its vigilance in the nearby city. Holding this complex was the key LOS on arrival of heavier units heading south from the Caen arena. Perhaps an early enough warning might allow for the purchase of artillery to stem their aggression. Perhaps not.

... ... ... There are more mobile artillery units active on the battlefield than I have armored units to locate them. The hillsides may be penetrated with a run from armored vehicles but will take more forces than I can afford to lose in order to occupy a northern city, or with plans to hold the position on arrival. Nevertheless, the coming turns will incorporate plans to field an armored vehicle or two with aim toward the northern objectives.

... ... ... The recon punch into the northeast supply area is a bag of trouble. The congestion there is what we anticipated, but no forces to deal them any substantial damage. In addition, our own occupation, with minimal units, is at jeopardy now that an enemy heavy artillery unit located there has decided to take aim at our recon position. The enemy will, in short order, be making his way down these roads to regain and occupy the small victory point areas, and push us back or eliminate us along the way. Best to retreat to thoroughfares and passes, fortify there and hope to delay the eventual assault on the east-central beaches.

... ... ... I envy the enemy's ability to find positions for all of his units that maximize his ability to fire on our locations. He has the advantage in unit count, the ability to calculate quickly his opportunity for movement into aggressive positions, and contains enough mobile unit artillery to double mine and probably eliminate my avenues of approach. The landing beach zones will be the final defensive holds. The attacker has been denied his aggression with ferocity of fire power and potential fire opportunities. The decisions had a meaningful rationale, but in a battlefield of this nature -- rationale had to be supported with real commitment of forces in a specific direction. Spreading the attack across the southern seaboard was an invitation to the enemy to let me become the defender and delay any advance. We suffer now as a result, defending our limited positions with damaged units, feeble bazookas, and scraps of the mighty ETs that seemed, so recently, to be staunch and permanent defenders of our cause.

... ... ... Many turns remained, I cannot remember the number. I recall that our fragile shell of defense continued to hold, but whittled slowly by long range fire from heavier units on the hilltops. The time was consumed listening to the endless enemy movement, watching mobilization of enemy platoons into groups of thugs that battered relentlessly the diligent remaining force entrenched within the beach. Our movements, our fires, were futile. Morale disintegrated as a powerless shell watched the predators peck away at its casing, seeking the annihilation of any remaining embryo of hope. We would stand tall, proud, for as long as possible. We would remain in force, but ultimately we would stand beaten, downtrodden, and lost.

A tough, tough, day indeed.

Endgame