Rommel's interest in Von Clauswitz's analysis of the nature and necessities of war has been exposed in his Rambles. Comment upon his efforts has been sparse. Does our community regard these ancient writings irrelevant or do the members just enjoy and leave it at that? There are other possibilities.
Since this community exists primarily as a body of interest centered about a game of war, The Perfect General II, does Von Clausewitz have any relevance to that? Or in fact does he have any relevance to anything anymore? This latter question is easier to examine, and it is the purpose of this report to look upon that through eyes of the author of a book reprising the Vietnam War with Von Clausewitz in mind.
In his work, On Strategy, a critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Col. Harry Summers notes that Clausewitz observed,
- - - "When we speak of destroying the enemy's forces, we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces. The moral element must be considered."
"This seems to me to express the essence of the nature of losing that cause and was as well summarized by a North Vietnamese officer when the author pointed out to him that the communists had never won a battle, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."
"So what is the appropriate question or set of questions that would make sense of this loss which was shoved into the jaws of victory? Reading this story from back to front might simplify the problem."
"In 1975 North Vietnamese regular forces in conventional battle array invaded the South and crushed the defending armies which fought alone. Why were they abandoned? US troops are even today poised in Korea to stand with that nation against the threat from their north. The war there was no more or or less a civil war than in VN. The U.S. "Vietnamized" that conflict with no less a promise of help than in Korea. Why did we fail to keep our promise?"
"Such a failure is likely to be the result of a destroyed morale if the means to keep it is intact."
(One of the factors that a general must take into consideration, according to Clausewitz, is the morale of the people and the will of the government, both his own and the enemy's, neither of which was very strong in the United States throughout the Vietnam conflict, and certainly weakest at wars end. - Rommel)