Lee had gone to see Ewell the night before to see if the commander of the Second Corps thought that he could move his forces from the left of the Confederate's line to the right, for an attack on the Federal's left flank, since Ewell thought that attacking the heights of Culp's Hill, the Federal army's right, was not practiciple. But Ewell did not want to give up the left. There were too much in the way of captured supplies and wounded to move in that short a period of time and giving up the ground that was won in such hard fighting would hurt the morale of his corps. Ewell and his subordinates successfully argued that the attack should be made on the right by Longstreet and the First Corps.

Once Lee had returned to his headquarters that evening, he must have changed his mind. Lee sent orders to Ewell instructing him to move his corps from the left to the right. This brought Ewell to Lee's headquarters around midnight. Ewell had decided that he could make a successful attack on Culp's Hill, now that the last of his three divisions had arrived. Lee was glad to hear this. This was the style of fighting that he was used too. Lee and Jackson had done this many times. The Second Corps would demonstrate on the Federal right, while Longstreet and his First Corps attacked on the enemy's left. Lee would crush the Federal Army between the anvil of his Second Corps and the hammer of his First. Lee rescinded the order for the Second Corps to move.

General Lee awoke at 3am and had breakfast. In the morning twilight Lee became unsure. At 4am Lee sent out scouting parties to find out about the Federal position. Longstreet soon arrived at Lee's headquarters and found him sitting on the trunk of a fallen tree just south of the seminary studying a map of the area. Longstreet reported that his corps was on the move. Two of his divisions, Hood's and McLaw's, had camped nearby that night, and would soon be available, although one of Hood's brigades was 20 miles away. Pickett's division was also on the way, but they would not be at Gettysburg until that evening at the earliest.

Lee was glad to hear this report, but not perhaps what Longstreet suggested next. Once again the Longstreet returned to his thoughts on maneuvering around the Federal right. Which Lee again rejected, as they watched brigade after brigade take position on the ridge just across the way.

Confederate Major General John Bell Hood, who his friends called Sam, arrived ahead of his division. Hood understood from what Lee told him, when the texan checked in, that Lee intended to attack. Longstreet took him aside and privately told Hood, "The general is a little nervous this morning. He wishes me to attack. I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like going into battle with one boot off." Which is exactly what had happened at the Battle of Second Manassas, where he literally fought the battle with a boot on one foot and a "carpet slipper" on the other.

McLaws arrived just after 8am ahead of his division and Lee showed him on the map where he wanted McLaws division deployed, asking if he could do so without being seen by "those people". McLaws thought that he could, but needed to look over the ground. Longstreet would not let him go, besides Lee told him a reconnaissance was under way and they should have a report soon. Longstreet then indicated on the map with his finger perpendicular to a line drawn there where he wanted McLaw's troops. "I want your division placed so."

"No General," Lee objected, "I wish it placed just opposite."