Captain Samuel R. Johnston returned from his early morning reconnaissance with the "usual delay in finding headquarters" and his report was everything that Lee had hoped for. According to Johnston, the Federals had left the southern portion of Cemetery Ridge unoccupied, as well as the Round Tops.

Lee asked pointedly, "Did you get there?"

Yes, Johnston reported, he had been on a western spur of Little Round Top.

Just how good of a reconnaissance could this have been? There was Federal cavalry posted in or near the Peach Orchard, under the command of Brigadier General John Buford. Stragglers of the Federal Third Corps were still coming up the Emmitsburg Road. Geary's division of the Twelfth Federal Corps had camped the previous night in the swampy ground between Cemetery Ridge and the Trosle farm, just north of the Round Tops (they may have been gone by the time Johnston arrived) and the Third Corps was in camp just to the east of that same ridge. At this same time, the Federal Second Corps was marching up the Taneytown Road. They would not have known the need to be quiet as they marched less than half a mile from the prominent hills at the south end of the battlefield, that at this time according to Johnston, were occupied by the scouts of the enemy. How could Johnston have not heard the sound of the foot falls of thousands of marching soldiers, the rattle of their equipment, rolling wagons, and cannons? This lead to an inaccurate report to Johnston's commanding general.

General Lee had heard little of Ewell's Corps. Lee had sent Major Venable to visit Ewell but he had not returned. At 9:00am Lee set out for Ewell's headquarters to see the left of his line for himself. When he arrived Ewell was not there, nor was Venable, they had gone out together. But Major General Trimble was there. The two generals exchanged greetings and Lee asked him if there was someplace he could go to get a good look at things. Trimble knew of just such a place and took Lee to the almshouse and its cupola. While they rode Lee remarked to Trimble, "we did not or could not pursue our advantage of yesterday." Ewell and Venable were at Ewell's headquarters when Lee and Trimble returned from their trip to the cupola of the almshouse. It was agreed that Ewell would keep his Second Corps where it was and coordinate the attack with Longstreet on the right. Ewell was to demonstrate on his front to keep the blue soldiers there from being used as reinforcements against Longstreet's attack.

At 10:00am Lee began his return to his own headquarters. As he rode through the town he listened for the sound of Longstreet's guns and became impatient, "What can detain Longstreet? He he ought to be in position by now!" According to Longstreet he had been given no orders to attack, although the assault had been discussed. Longstreet also said that after Lee's visit to Ewell Lee had said, "that it would not do to have Ewell open the attack." Lee then ordered him to attack from the right. Longstreet asked for a half hour delay so that Hood's missing brigade might close up. Lee agreed. At noon with two, now complete, divisions Longstreet set out.

Now begins one of the controversies of the Battle of Gettysburg. Longstreet is charged by those the revile him, that he dragged his feet, that he intentionally delayed the attack on the Federal's left. Longstreet his detractors say, would sulk when he didn't get his way. Moxely Sorrel, a member of Longstreet's staff and friend, a friendship that would last for another 40 years, wrote that the Lieutenant General "failed to conceal some anger". In a letter to his mother Sorrel wrote, "On some days [Longstreet is] very sociable and agreeable, then again for a few days he will confine himself mostly to his room, or tent, without having much to say to anyone, and is as grim as you please." The general behaved that way when he was unwell, as might be expected, but he also acted that way when "something has not gone to suit him. When anything has gone wrong, he does not say much, but merely looks grim." The staff had learned to expect this behavior and did not "talk much to him" before finding out if he was in "a talkative mood."

As earlier stated Longstreet had been asking Lee to "redeploy" the army in a position between the Federal army and Washington. This would cause Meade to pursue and then on ground of the Confederate Army's choosing fight and win a decisive battle that could end the war. Lee would have nothing to do with that suggestion. Not only could he not get the commanding general to listen to his ideas, but he could not even deploy his own troops as he saw fit. Perhaps this is why Longstreet was "in a mood".